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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
WHETHER CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO REVIEW
A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DETERMINING
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO
THE LOCATION OF THE PARTIES' COMMON BOUNDARY
LINE WERE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is contained at 61
Utah Adv. Rep. 33, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A"
in the addendum to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari (hereinafter the "Petition").
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Respondents do not dispute this Court's jurisdiction
over

the

amended).

Petition under

Utah

Code Ann.

§ 78-2-2

(1953

as

The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered

July 6, 1987.
CONTROLLING RULES
RULE 43. CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING REVIEW OF
CERTIORARI
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a
matter of right, but of judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor. The
following, while neither controlling nor
wholly measuring the Court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons that will
be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals
has rendered a decision in conflict with a
decision of another panel of the Court of
Appeals on the same issue of law;
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(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals
has decided a question of state or federal
law in a way that is in conflict with a
decision of this Court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals
has rendered a decision that has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as
to call for an exercise of this Court's
power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided
an important question of municipal, state,
or federal law which has not been, but
should be settled by this Court.
Rule 43, R. Utah S. Ct.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Hatanaka

(respondent

in this appeal) does

not dispute the Statement of the Case contained in the Petition.

However, plaintiff also points out that in addition to

determining the location of the parties' common boundary line
and finding a trespass by defendants Struhs, the trial court
ordered defendants to remove dirt, debris and a fence placed by
defendants

on plaintiff's

defendants

from trespassing

property
in the

and permanently
future.

In

enjoined

addition

to

affirming that portion of the Judgment, the Court of Appeals
also affirmed the decision of the trial court not to award
punitive damages, or attorneys1 fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann,
§ 78-27-56 (1953 as amended).

The Court of Appeals reversed an
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award of certain survey costs to plaintiff.

Although plaintiff

had cross-appealed on the issues of punitive damages and attorneys' fees, plaintiff is not filing a cross-petition for certiorari.

This case was heard by the Court of Appeals pursuant to

transfer by this Court, exercising its "pour over" authority
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1953 as amended) and Rule 4A,
R. Utah S. Ct.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The

Statement

of

Facts

contained

in

the

Petition

ignores the survey evidence relied upon by the trial court in
determining the location of the parties1 common boundary line.
This survey evidence, which is set forth in detail in the district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Findings and Conclusions") appended as Exhibit "D" to the Petition,
was also relied upon by the Court of Appeals in affirming the
lower court judgment.
As set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals at
61 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, both the Little Mountain Subdivision No.
2 (Little Mountain), which is at issue in this case, and the
Killyons Subdivision (Killyons), lying to the north of Little
Mountain in the Emigration Canyon area of Salt Lake County,
were platted by E. G. Swenson in 1909-1910.

Although Swenson

was the County Surveyor at the time, both of these recorded
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subdivision plats were based on private surveys conducted by
Swenson.

According

to

Swenson's

plats, he

identified

the

beginning point of Little Mountain as the southwest corner of
Section 27, and the beginning point of Killyons as the northwest corner of the same section.

Findings, 1f 1.

The official survey of Section 27 by the U.S. Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) was done in 1881, prior to the Swenson
survey, and the field notes from the BLM survey were admitted
into evidence at trial, as were the field notes of a Utah
Department of Transportation (UDOT) survey of Emigration Canyon
done between 1932 and 1936.

Although the BLM field notes indi-

cate that a sandstone monument was placed at the Southwest
corner of Section 27, the Swenson plats do not refer to that
monument, and no survey conducted subsequent to the BLM survey
has been able to locate this monument.

However, the UDOT field

notes incorporate the BLM field notes.

Findings, 1f1f 1, 5, 10,

11.
At some unknown time prior to the UDOT survey, the
Salt Lake County Surveyor placed a cedar post as the location
of the southwest corner of Section 27.

However, all parties

and the current Salt Lake County Surveyor agree that this post
does not accurately identify either the southwest corner of
Section 27 or the beginning point of Little Mountain.
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Because

the cedar post is not an accurate control point, surveys of the
Little Mountain

area

have had to use another

control point.

The control point that has been used at least as early as the
UDOT survey is a steel pipe, which has been found to be located
at the northwest corner of Lot 25 in Little Mountain.

Although

the origin of the steel pipe is unknown, use of the steel pipe
as a control point for the northwest corner of Lot 25 in Little
Mountain

is

landmarks

consistent

identified

with

in

the

M

callsM

BLM

or

distances

survey,

Mountain plat and the UDOT survey.

the

from other

Swenson

Little

Findings, 1f1f 7, 11, 13, 14,

17.
The UDOT
monument
BLM

survey

was

unable

to

identified in the BLM survey.

field

notes

and

the

procedures

for

monuments, the UDOT survey was able to
point

of Little Mountain

steel pipe was located
Little Mountain.

and was

locate the

sandstone

However, by using the
locating
locate

obliterated

the

beginning

able to determine that

at the northwest

the

corner of Lot 25 in

UDOT relied on its survey in condemning pro-

perty in Little Mountain for right of way purposes, and numerous deeds of property

in Little Mountain (including deeds to

and from Salt Lake County
steel

pipe

as

a control

northwest corner of Lot 25.

in the
point

1940s and

marking

the

1950s) used

the

location

the

of

Findings, 1f1f 13, 14, 16, 17, 21.
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Use of the steel pipe as such a control point is consistent with the "fit" of existing natural and man made landmarks in Little Mountain, including the location of the roadway, creek and various homes and fencelines.

Accordingly, the

steel pipe has been used as a marker for surveys

in Little

Mountain for over 45 years, including surveys performed by such
firms as Bush & Gudgell, Coon, King & Knowlton, and Larsen and
Malmquist

for plaintiff Hatanaka and adjoining landowners in

Little Mountain.

Even a survey obtained by defendants Struhs

in 1962 used the steel pipe as a control point, although when
defendant

Kenneth Struhs saw where

the

surveyor

staked

the

property lines, he instructed the surveyor not to certify the
survey.

Findings, 1f1f 19, 20, 22, 27, 28.
The later survey obtained by defendants for purposes

of trial was uncertified and was inconsistent with all of the
above survey evidence (including defendants' own 1962 survey)
and inconsistent with the location

of defendants' house as

shown on their own building permit and proof of appropriation
of water.

Defendants' trial survey was based on the presumed

beginning point of Killyons rather than Little Mountain, and on
the assumption that the two subdivisions were contiguous.

How-

ever, other evidence at trial showed that the two subdivisions
are not contiguous.

According to defendants'
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trial

survey,

defendants' own home should be located in the middle of the
road, and even under that survey, Struhs' fence and fill dirt
intruded onto Hatanaka's property.

Findings, 1f1f 31, 32, 33,

34, 35, 36, 37.
Accordingly, the trial court found that

the survey

relied upon by Struhs at trial was inaccurate, and the court
determined the location of the parties' common boundary line
consistent with the BLM field notes, the Swenson Little Mountain plat, the UDOT survey and the rest of the above survey and
other evidence tied to the use of the steel post as a proper
control point marking the northwest corner of Lot 25.

See,

Findings and Conclusions, generally.
ARGUMENT AGAINST ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
I.

CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED WHERE THE
ONLY ISSUE IS THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

Rule 43, R. Utah S. Ct., quoted above, provides that
review by certiorari is not a matter of right but of discretion, which will be exercised only in extremely limited circumstances, i.e. "when there are special and important reasons
therefor."

The Petition meets none of the illustrative cri-

teria for certiorari set forth in subdivisions (1) through (4)
of

Rule

43,

and

defendants

offer

no

other

"special"

or

"important" reason why they should be afforded an extra level
of appellate review.
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The Court of Appeals was created to streamline the
appellate process in this State, which commonly had taken three
years or more to complete in routine civil cases such as this,
due to the overwhelming workload facing this Court.

If certi-

orari is to be granted in cases like this one, where the only
issue is the weight of the evidence, then not only will the
purposes for the Court of Appeals be frustrated, but the appellate process will become even more cumbersome and time consuming than it already was.
remain

unabated,

and

Also, this Court's workload will

rather

than focusing

its attention on

weighty issues of policy as intended, the Court will be relegating itself to second guessing the error correction function
of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals performed its function well in
this case.

After carefully reviewing the survey evidence and

applying the clearly erroneous standard of review to the Findings of Fact (in light of the district court's unique opportunity to determine witness credibility), the Court of Appeals
determined

that

rather

than being

"clearly

erroneous",

the

Findings were supported by the overwhelming weight of the credible evidence:
In the instant case, the Findings of Fact
were based on four days of trial and the
testimony of thirteen witnesses. The critical Conclusion of Law delineating the common
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boundary between the parties is based on the
weight and credibility of the surveys found
to be closest to what should be expected
when the field notes of the BLM and UDOT
surveys are consulted.
Instead of being
clearly erroneous, we believe that the Findings of Fact flow logically from the testimony presented and, therefore, will not be
disturbed.
Hatanaka v. Struhs, 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, at 33-34 (Ct. App.
1987) (footnote omitted).
II.

DEFENDANTS1 ARGUMENT MISCHARACTERIZES
THE ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT.

Defendants Struhs contend that the trial court erred
in failing to relocate (or in failing to order the county surveyor to relocate) the spot upon which the BLM surveyor erected
a sandstone monument in 1881 to mark the southwest corner of
Section 27.

However, the issue is not where the BLM found the

southwest corner of Section 27 to be in 1881, the issue is
where E. G. Swenson commenced Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2
pursuant to the subdivision plat he recorded in 1910.

This is

an issue of fact upon which neither the Court of Appeals nor
this Court may substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court.
Contrary to the cases relied upon by defendants, their
property rights do not flow from government patent or any other
deed or grant of land referencing or incorporating either the
sandstone monument or the BLM survey.
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Instead, these property

rights flow from the Swenson subdivision plat, which contains
no mention of the sandstone monument or the 1881 BLM survey.
While the BLM survey is not controlling, it is probative, because the Little Mountain Plat shows on its face that
Swenson did attempt to locate the beginning point of the subdivision in accordance with where the BLM field notes described
the location of the southwest corner of Section 27.

In this

regard, all of the surveys relied upon by plaintiff also used
the BLM field notes and recreated the BLM survey from those
field notes, when the sandstone monument referenced in the BLM
survey could not be found.
In retracing the BLM survey from the field notes and
thus relocating the southwest corner of Section 27, all of
these surveyors discovered that the steel pipe was located at
the northwest corner of Lot 25, as the lot and the subdivision
had been platted by Swenson.

Since the pipe could be tied to

the southwest corner of Section 27 as shown on both the BLM
survey and the Swenson plat, and since the BLM's sandstone
monument could not be located, the pipe was appropriately used
for a control point.

Plaintiff's surveys were also consistent

with the MfitM of other landmarks and improvements within the
subdivision and were a proper basis for the trial court's decision fixing the location of the disputed boundary.
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On the other hand, the survey relied upon by defendants at trial ignored the BLM survey and field notes and was
tied only to the location of a neighboring subdivision based on
the mistaken belief that the two subdivisions were contiguous.
Defendants'

survey was

Little Mountain.
defendants1

also

inconsistent with the "fit" of

Moreover, even defendants' survey showed that

fence

and

fill

dirt were placed on plaintiff's

property.
The Petition

is also incorrect

in stating that the

trial court determined the rights of non-parties.

The trial

court was called upon to determine only the property rights of
the parties before it.

This is not a quiet title action, and

only the rights of plaintiff and defendants were fixed by the
trial court's determination of the disputed boundary and of
defendants' trespass.
The three cases relied upon by defendants in attempting to argue [presumably under Rule 43(2), R. Utah S. Ct. ] that
the Court of Appeals decision conflicts with prior decisions of
this Court are:

Barbizon of Utah, Inc. v. General Oil Co., 24

Utah 2d 321, 471 P.2d 148 (1970); Washington Rock Co. v. Young,
29 Utah 108, 80 P. 382 (1905); and Cornia v. Putnam, 26 Utah 2d
354, 489 P.2d 1001 (1971).

However, a review of these cases

reveals that they actually support the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
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Defendants cite Barbizon and Washington Rock for the
propositions

that

M

[o]fficial

government

surveys

cannot

be

changed in a dispute over boundary lines between individuals/1
and that government surveys and section corner monuments are
the "best evidence" in a private boundary dispute.
dants' Petition at 8-12.

See, Defen-

They rely on Cornia in arguing that

the trial court failed to distinguish between whether the missing BLM monument

at the southwest corner of Section 27 was

"lost" or "obliterated."

See, Defendants' Petition at 9, n.l.

However, the reason this Court found the BLM surveys to be controlling in resolving the private boundary disputes in these
cases was that the sources of title of the respective parties
involved were federal land patents based on BLM surveys.

See,

Barbizon at 471 P.2d 148 and Washington Rock at 80 P. 385.
In the case at hand, the source of both plaintiff's
and defendants' title is private deeds to numbered lots in a
privately platted subdivision.

Here, the recorded subdivision

plat is the "original" survey, since it makes no reference to
the BLM survey, other
Defendants

correctly

surveys,
point

out

or

any government

that

any

rights

monument.
created

by

"official" government surveys can not be altered by subsequent
private surveys.

By the same token, rights created by private

surveys cannot be altered by inconsistent government surveys,
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as the trial court

ruled.

(appended as Exhibit

M

See, Memorandum

Decision

at 22

C M to defendants' Petition) and Conclu-

sions of Law, 1f 3.
Thus, even if the county surveyor were to replace the
missing BLM sandstone monument pursuant to § 17-23-9 Utah Code
Ann. (1953), as defendants urge, this would have no effect on
the rights of the parties under a subdivision plat not tied to
that monument.

Defendants concede as much in admitting that

the cedar post currently used by the county surveyor to mark
the southwest corner of Section 27 does not accurately reflect
the beginning point of Little Mountain.

See, Defendants* Peti-

tion at 7.
If Swenson had used a commencement

point

different

from where the BLM survey found the southwest corner of Section
27 to be, the Swenson survey would still control, because the
Swenson survey is the source of both plaintiff's and defendants' title, not the BLM survey.

The reason the trial court

considered the BLM survey at all in this private boundary dispute is that the evidence indicated that Swenson used the same
"calls" (i.e., 5 chains from the road bisecting the subdivision
and 6.5 chains from Emigration Creek) in locating the beginning
point of his subdivision, as were used by the BLM surveyor in
locating the southwest corner of Section 27.
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To this extent,

Barbizon, Cornia and Washington Rock become relevant in determining the probative value of the respective surveys relied
upon by the parties here.

However, the reason for this Court's

rejection of the private surveys in those cases is because
those surveys ignored the government's surveys and field notes.
By contrast, here all of the surveys relied upon by
plaintiff (including the UDOT survey performed in the 1930s)
used or were consistent with the BLM survey and field notes,
all of which were in turn ignored by the survey relied upon by
defendants at trial.

Defendants' cases establish the probative

value of plaintiff's surveys and the lack of any probative
value of defendants' own trial survey.
Defendants' description of this Court's analysis in
these cases of the "best evidence" of a government survey, and
the distinction between "lost" government monuments and "obliterated"

government

monuments, is extremely misleading.

In

discussing the "best evidence" of a government survey, these
cases refer to the best available evidence.

If the government

monuments have not been lost or obliterated then they are obviously the best evidence.

However, all three of the cases make

it very clear that if these monuments cannot be found, as here,
then the BLM field notes become the "best" evidence.
the evidence relied upon by plaintiff
defendants.
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here

and

This is

ignored

by

Cornia also makes it clear that a governmental monument is "lost" rather than "obliterated" only if its original
location cannot be found by use of the government surveyor's
field notes.

If the field notes enable the government survey

to be re-created, then the monument
than "lost" and the procedure

for

is "obliterated" rather
relocation

is simply to

retrace the government survey from the field notes.

The trial

court here expressly found that the UDOT surveys, plaintiff's
surveys introduced at trial and all other surveys relied upon
by plaintiff followed or were consistent with the BLM survey
and field notes.

Accordingly, there is no merit to defendants'

contentions that the trial court did not determine whether the
monument at the southwest corner of Section 27 was "lost" or
merely "obliterated," and that plaintiff's surveys were unable
to locate this corner.
The surveys plaintiff relies upon did not replace the
obliterated monument because this is the job of the county
surveyor under § 17-23-9 and because there was no need to do
so.

The steel pipe referred to in all of these surveys was

tied both to the BLM survey and to the Swenson plat and was
appropriate for use as a control point instead of the missing
monument.
There is nothing in any of the cases cited by defendants to suggest that if the purpose for finding the location
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of an obliterated government monument is to resolve a private
boundary dispute, that only the county surveyor is empowered to
perform this task under § 17-23-9.

To the contrary, Barbizon,

Cornia and Washington Rock all indicate that, as here, evidence
of the original location of an obliterated government monument
from private surveyors using original government field notes is
the "best evidence" of government surveys, where the government
surveys are used to find the location of private boundaries.
Resolution

of private boundary

disputes

cannot

be

made

to

depend upon the county surveyor's performance or nonperformance
of § 17-23-9 public duties, especially where the private rights
at issue flow from a privately platted subdivision, not from
any public or government survey.
Again,

it was

only defendants'

trial

survey which

ignored the "best evidence" found in the BLM field notes and
instead relied upon the false assumption that the Little Mountain and Killyons subdivision boundaries were contiguous.

It

was only that survey that ignored the "fit" of all landmarks
and

improvements

within

Little Mountain,

to the

extent

of

shifting the location of defendants' own home into the platted
road.

Since even this survey conclusively establishes defen-

dants' trespass, there was no basis for the Court of Appeals to
disturb the weight given to the evidence by the trial court.
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CONCLUSION
None
Rule

43

for

of

the

grant

extraordinary

of

defendants' attempts

certiorari

circumstances
are present

required

here.

by

Despite

to mislead the district court, the Court

of Appeals, and now this Court, as to the nature of the issues
presented by this private boundary dispute, these
purely
Court

factual
of

ones

Appeals

involving only the parties

correctly

ruled

Findings were mandated by the
resolving these factual

that

evidence,

issues.

the

at bar.

district

thereby

Plaintiff

issues are
The

court's

conclusively

respectfully urges

this Court to deny defendants' Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
DATED this

^ Q

'u

day of August, 1987.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

^^,4PT7^^Jam^rs A. Boevers
Attorneys
for
Plaintiff
Respondent
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and

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that, on the J-\

day of August,

1987, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four true and
correct

copies

of

the

foregoing

BRIEF

OF

RESPONDENT

OPPOSITION TO PETITION to the following:
Roy G. Haslam
Paul D. Veasy
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
John Walsh
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
Suite 202, Cove Point Plaza
3865 South Wasatch Boulevard
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

^^^x^^fe^V /^
6797G
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